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  1On the usefulness of the directional distance function in analyzing environmental policy 






In many European countries, water quality problems associated with the use of synthetic 
fertilizers and the disposal of animal waste have become a major environmental policy issue. 
Nitrates in drinking water supplies and eutrophication of inland and coastal waters are of 
particular concern. Increasing concentrations of nitrates in groundwater - the primary source 
of drinking water in many regions - have been observed, notably in France. Agriculture is not 
the only source of nitrates in ground and surface waters but it is one of those that give most 
cause for concern. There is widespread interest in implementing policies that will be more 
effective in protecting water quality without causing undue economic harm to agricultural 
producers.  
 
The two farming practices that most concern policymakers are the use of large amounts of 
fertilizer for crop growth and the disposal of livestock manure. Both materials are sources of 
nitrogen, which is transformed into nitrate once in the soil. Nitrate that is not used by plants or 
transformed back into atmospheric nitrogen leaches through the soil or runs off into water 
supplies. Intensive livestock production is an important source of pollution, due to an 
insufficient area of land available to farmers for spreading manure. This is particularly 
relevant for pig production. The direct impact of pig production on the environment is in 
some areas really severe. Along with the expansion of production, there have also been 
significant structural changes in the pig sector. Pig farming has become more intensive, with 
fewer farms producing a larger number of pigs, often with very little land, and more 
specialized, with feed obtained from off-farm sources. Developments in production 
technologies have allowed significant productivity gains, particularly for large-scale 
producers. Pig farming has become more regionally concentrated. A major factor encouraging 
the development and uptake of productivity-enhancing technologies has been the intense 
competition in the meat market and the long-run decline in real prices received by farmers, 
which in turn is driven by productivity improvements.  
 
In response to high nitrate levels in water supplies, the European Union passed its Nitrate 
Directive in 1991. Its objective is to limit the amount of nitrogen remaining in the soil as a 
residual after uptake by crops. The Directive limits the spreading of organic nitrogen per farm 
to 170 kilograms per hectare in nitrate vulnerable zones. Each European member state has 
organized the implementation of this Directive, defining a set of constraints relevant for their 
own country on the use of nitrogen fertilizer, the numbers of livestock, and the storage and 
disposal of manure. In France, this implementation has been in effect since 1993. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to model the manure management policy implemented in the 
European Union, and more specifically the limit imposed on the spreading of organic 
nitrogen. A theoretical model is defined in such a way that a number of specificities 
concerning livestock production can be introduced. Manure, the by-product of livestock 
production, is not in fact directly a polluting output. It can be used on farms as a fertilizer for 
productive land and only actually becomes a pollutant when it is disposed of in the 
environment without taking account of the uptake capacity of the soil or crops. Up to a certain 
level therefore, it can be used as an input in the crop production process. Beyond this level, it 
  2is considered as an undesirable output that has to be disposed of. The European regulation on 
the maximum amount of organic nitrogen that can be spread per farm is applicable to the by-
product of livestock production, i.e. directly to the manure itself, rather than to the actual 
polluting output, which is the nitrogen surplus. This particular feature, which is introduced 
into the theoretical framework, can be used to assess the impact of this regulatory measure on 
the production choices made by livestock farmers.  
 
As a result of the specialization of pig production, farms have very little of their own land 
available for disposing of their undesirable output. They have to look for land outside their 
own farm perimeter, but within a restricted geographical area limited by the cost of 
transporting the manure. The theoretical framework is used to investigate how the land can be 
shared out optimally between the non-productive purpose of spreading manure in a manner 
compliant with the environmental regulation and the productive function of providing crops.  
 
In the second part of this paper, we define an empirical model derived from the previous 
theoretical model, using the directional distance function. This function allows a relatively 
flexible representation of the production technology and environmental regulation. It also 
provides a framework for deriving shadow prices of pollutant, of productive and non 
productive use of land and of the constraint on organic manure involved by the European 
environmental regulation. The directional distance function also enables us to take any 
inefficiency present into account and therefore to measure any indirect benefits resulting from 
the environmental regulation.  
 
The final part of this paper provides an illustration of the analysis framework, developed from 
a sample of farms in Brittany, France, some specializing in the intensive production of pigs in 
1996 and others not. The illustration gives a value to the non-productive function of land, in 
other words to the disposal of nitrogen excess through spreading. This paper provides an 
analysis of the impact the European environmental regulation on manure management has on 
the production choices made by livestock farmers, and also an assessment of certain indirect 
costs and/or benefits borne by producers. 
 
Theoretical model 
This section presents a theoretical model incorporating undesirable output in agricultural 
production and more specifically considering the regulation concerning manure management 
in the European Union. 
We consider the pig sector and assume that farms produce two consumption goods: livestock 
(A) and crops (C) using two distinct farming technologies. As a first step, we assume that 
there is two separate production function. We don not consider the link between crop and 
livestock production processes. All crops are assumed to be sold on the crops market. These 
two production functions are   and  , respectively, with   the land area 
allocated to the disposal of manure from rearing activities and   the land area allocated to 
crop production. At this step, we assume that the total land available is 
) , ( A A A k L f ) , ( C C C k L f A L
C L
A A L L L + =  and 
L LC ⊆ .  A L  is the land area where manure can not be spread for best agronomic practices, 
like lands located near rivers, drinking sources or in sensible areas.   and  A L A L  are variable 
input while L is fixed in the short run. The main difference in the production function is the 
given technology and the sector specific capital   and  . We assume that these production 
functions are differentiable and concave. 
A k kC
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is produced by each farm. As a first step, we focus our analysis on undesirable output or bad. 
However, this model can be easily extended to unmarketable desirable goods as landscape. 
Thus, we assume the production of a bad output b  causing environmental deterioration:  
) , ( ) , ( C C C C A A A A k L f k L f b α α + =  with  A α  and C α  non negative coefficients. 
 
The environmentally undesirable output related to pig and crops production is nitrogen 
surplus, i.e., manure that cannot be spread on farm’s land due to the crop production process 
chosen by the farmer related to the good agricultural practices involved.  
 
In environmental economics, a first best optimal solution can be derived by setting up a social 
planner’s utility maximization problem. The bad output causing a nuisance is considered as an 
argument of the social planner’s utility function as it has an impact on the society’s well-
being. This utility function is U . We assume this function to be differentiable, strictly 
quasi-concave, increasing in desirable outputs and decreasing in undesirable output (U , 
>0 and U ). 
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For the maximization problem of the social planner, we have the following Lagrangian: 
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and the first conditions are 
 
(3)  0 1 = − = ∂ ∂ λ A U A l  
(4)  0 2 = − = ∂ ∂ λ C U C l b 
(5)  0 3 = + = ∂ ∂ λ b U b l  
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Equations (7) and (8) are the optimality conditions that guarantee an efficient input use in 
livestock and crop farming processes. In particular, the environmental deterioration is optimal 
up to the point where the marginal utility value of the marketable goods plus the marginal 
disutility value of the unmarketable good equals the private cost of production of the desirable 
goods. 
Consequently, each technology (livestock and crops) should be optimally implemented when 

























Assume that competitive farms are producing both products at market prices   and  , 
respectively. Farms are assumed to determine the level of desirable goods on the basis of an 
profit maximisation objective function. In the specific case of pig production, there exists an 
environmental standard concerning the spreading of organic manure from rearing activities. 
The regulation states the maximum amount of organic manure spread such as: 
A p C p
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where  170 = A b kg/ha of organic manure spread on fields. 
Thus, we have: 
 
(11)  ) ( A A A A A A A A A A f L b q L r f p α π − − − =  
and 
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where   and   are land rent and q  the shadow price or Lagrangian multipliers related to 
the organic manure constraint. The optimality conditions imply: 
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The above optimal conditions imply that regulation setting a constraint  A b  on the spreading of 
organic manure from rearing activities correspond to a specific relation where the level of the 
restriction and the shadow price related to organic manure. If the negative environmental 
impact of these activities is not introduced, then the usual measures of economic efficiency 
are biased. The shadow price q  provides an indication on how producers value the 
constraints on organic manure induced by the regulation on organic manure. 
A
 
Furthermore, the above model provides some additional information concerning the value of 
agricultural land in two different functions. The rent value   characterises the value of land 
in its unproductive function that is the disposal of manure while the rent value   is the value 





In this section, we provide an empirical model for the previous theoretical framework. We 
based our analysis on developments from Färe et al. (2001, 2005) and Färe and Grosskopf 
(2004). These authors provide a generalisation of the Shephard output distance function that 
allows one to consider non-proportional changes in outputs. The directional output distance 
function allows one output to be expanded while another is contracted. This property is 
particularly suitable when we study polluting outputs since most of the regulation concerning 
these undesirable goods is interested in pollution reduction. The directional output distance 
function is also a measure of efficiency. Since it simultaneously accounts for pollution 
reduction and good improvements, it is a combined environmental and technical efficiency 
measures. 
Let   and b  be vectors of goods and bad outputs, 
respectively. Let   be a vector of inputs. The reference technology can be 
described as an output possibilities set   that for a given vector of inputs denotes all 
technically feasible output vectors. This output set is assumed to be convex and compact with 
. Furthermore, inputs and good outputs are assumed to be freely disposable and 
bad outputs only weakly disposable. Livestock good and organic manure good are assumed to 
be null-joint. This means that livestock cannot be produced without organic manure. The 
directional output distance function is defined on   as: 
M
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The function in (17) inherits its properties from  . If  ) (x P 0 ) , ; , , ( = − b y o g g b y x D
r
, the farm is 
efficient in the   direction. Feasible but inefficient farms will take a value greater that 
zero, reflecting the additional good output and reduction in pollution that this particular 
productive unit could achieve if it were on the best practice frontier. The higher the value the 
more inefficient is the productive unit. 
) , ( b y g g −
 
This approach can be used to derive shadow prices based on the duality between the 
directional output distance function and the revenue function. Following Färe et al. (2005), let 
  60 ) 1 , 1 ; , , ( = − b y x Do
r
 be the selected output distance function. This function completely 
characterises the technology. Let   and   represent 
absolute prices of good and bad outputs, respectively. In our specific case, 
M
M R p p p + ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1
S
S R q q q + ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1
p  is desirable 
good prices (livestock and crops) while q is the price of undesirable outputs (pollution). The 
revenue function can be specify as: 
 




Chambers et al. (1998) have shown that the lagrangian multiplier for the above problem is: 
1 . 1 . q p qg pg b y − = − = λ  for  ) 1 , 1 ( − = g . Therefore, we can write the revenue function as: 
 




Equation (19) is an unconstrained maximisation problem. From the first-order conditions, we 
get: 
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(21) 
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Furthermore, if we assume that one price is known, for example, one of the market prices of 
the desirable outputs, then we may compute the absolute price for the undesirable output as 
argued in Färe et al. (2005). Here, we assume that  , the absolute price for the first output is 
known and is equalled to its shadow price (
1 p
1 1 q p = ). Then, we may compute the price of the 
bad output   as:  b
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Let   observations (j=1,…,J). The program in (17) can be rewritten in a DEA (Data 
Envelopment analysis) framework as: 
J
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The dual values for each equation can be evaluated at the optimum of these linear programs. 
Thus, if we assume that  , the absolute price for crops output is known and is equalled to its 
shadow price ( ). we have: 
C p
C C q p =
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with   the shadow price of the polluting good, i.e;, the nitrogen surplus.  b q
Based on the same reasoning, it is possible to derive the price of land in its two distinct 
function: the productive one and the disposal one. 
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In order to evaluate the shadow price of the constraint on organic manure, we have to develop 
the link between nitrogen surplus and organic manure as follows: 
 
(26) ) , ( ) , ( C C C C A A A A k L f k L f b α α + =  and  A A A A A A L b k L f ≤ ) , ( α  
 
In the case of nitrate management, the equation (26) can be rewritten as: 
 
(27)   and  exp min N N Norg b − + = Norg L Norg ⋅ ≤170  
 
with Norg the level of organic manure produced by rearing activities on farm, Nmin the level 
of mineral fertilizers used in crops production, Nexp the level of nitrogen exported by crops 
  8during their growth process and   the land acreage on which organic manure can be 
spread. When, we introduce the above equations, we can derive the shadow prices for the 




This analytical framework is illustrated on a sample of farm data from Brittany pig farms that 
participate in the Farm Accountancy Data Network in 1996. The selective sample consists on 
188 farms that are specialised in pig production and have a nitrogen surplus. Some of them do 
not respect the constraint imposed by the European regulation on organic manure. 
 
The directional output distance function is estimated on the following input and output 
variables. The good outputs are total livestock products and the total crops products in euros. 
The bad output is nitrogen surplus. It is an estimation based on the nitrogen balance of each 
farm. Inputs are an aggregate in euros describing the capital structure of the farm with capital, 
machinery and buildings, labour in annual worker units, arable area in hectare and an 
aggregate in euros of other variable inputs. These variables describe the technology of this 
productive sector and are used to derive the shadow prices of the polluting good, of the 
restrictive constraint on organic manure spreading and of the productive and non-productive 
land use. 
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